This paper studies Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive scheme for local government in England. Motivated by a simple theoretical political agency model, we predict that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of service provision. We test these predictions using a di¤erence in di¤erence approach, using Welsh local authorities as a control group, exploiting the fact that local authorities in Wales were not subject to the same CPA regime. To do this, we construct original indices of service quality and e¢ ciency, using Best Value Performance Indicators. We estimate that CPA increased the e¤ective band D council tax rate in England relative to Wales by 4%, and increased our index of service quality output also by about 4%, but had no signi…cant e¤ect on our e¢ ciency indices. There is evidence of heterogenous e¤ects of CPA on e¢ ciency, with some evidence that CPA impacted more on less e¢ cient councils, and the "harder test" from 2005-8 having a much bigger e¤ect.
Introduction
In recent years, implicit explicit incentive schemes for public organizations, based on quantitative measurement of outputs, have become increasingly commonly used in the UK 1 .
For example, school league tables, hospital star ratings, and various schemes for local government, such as Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), have been introduced in the last twenty years or so. The focus of this paper is on CPA, the most important such scheme for local government. This scheme, introduced in 2001, rated local governments in England on the quality of service in six major areas: education, housing; social care; environment; libraries and leisure; use of resources. Hundreds of performance indicators and a variety of audit and inspection reports were collected, summarized, weighted, and categorized so as to arrive at …nal star ratings between 0 and 4 2 .
As well as an evaluation scheme, CPA was also an incentive scheme. The stated objective of the CPA was to target support at those councils that need it most, and to o¤er a number of bene…ts for better-performing councils, including elimination of "ring-fencing" grants, and a three-year exemption from subsequent audit inspections 3 . Moreover, because the results of the CPA were widely disseminated in the media, it was also an exercise in providing voters with more information about the performance of their local council, both absolutely, and relative to other councils. In turn, this, in principle, provides indirect incentives for good performance. Indeed, there is evidence that councils which performed poorly on CPA were punished by the voters at subsequent elections 4 .
CPA is of particular interest because it is, to our knowledge, the only explicit evaluation 1 Schemes of this type have been little used outside the UK. There are exceptions: in the US, for example, the No Child Left Behind legislation punishes schools …nancially for poor test results, which are made public to parents. 2 In fact, from 2002-5, the rankings were designated: "excellent", "good", "fair", "weak", and "poor", changing to zero to four stars during the latter part of CPA -see Tables A1 and A2 below. But, for simplicity, we refer to star ratings thoughout. 3 "High scoring councils were Councils that were performing well under CPA would enjoy reduced audit and inspection regimes, and their associated fees, and be granted greater ‡exibilities and borrowing freedoms by central government. At the other end of the performance spectrum, a combination of audit, inspection and other improvement work was to be commissioned as an outcome of the CPA process, with the aim of transforming failing or poorly performing authorities." (Audit Commission(2009) ). 4 Revelli (2008) …nds that an increase in one star rating increaes the probability that the incumbent party retains control of the council by seven percentage points, and Boyne et al. (2009) …nd "a low CPA score (0 or 1 star) increases the likelihood of a change in political control".
scheme to date, worldwide, that numerically scores and rewards elected representatives, as opposed to public service managements. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of CPA on local government in three dimensions: quality of service delivery, taxation policy, and the e¢ ciency with which services were provided. Figure 1 below shows the average CPA score achieved by English local authorities from the beginning to the end of the CPA experience together with the average current local expenditure. There is clearly a steady upward trend in average CPA star ratings. Indeed, the Audit Commission declared o¢ cially in 2009 (Audit Commission(2009) ) that the CPA had done its job stimulating a continuous improvement in local government performance. However, Figure 1 also shows that at the same time, expenditure by local governments went up, more or less in line with CPA scores. So, the key problem is that we do not observe the counterfactual; given the large increases in local government spending over this period, it may be that service delivery would have improved anyway, even in the absence of the CPA. To address this, we treat the CPA as a natural experiment by exploiting the fact that it was only introduced in England, whereas in Wales, where the structure of local government is the same, a much weaker performance management scheme was introduced (Haubrich and McLean (2006b) Martin, et al (2010) ). In particular, in Wales, there were no quantitative rankings, much less information published, and authorities also had a say with regard to the type of inspections they would like to see for speci…c services. So, we use local authorities in Wales as a control group when assessing the impact of CPA on the treatment group, the English councils.
What would we expect the e¤ects of a scheme such as CPA to be on service quality, tax levels, and e¢ ciency? We develop a simple two-period political agency model in the paper to look speci…cally on the e¤ect on taxation and e¢ ciency of an incentive scheme that both rewards service quality and provides information about this quality to voters. In any period, the quality of a public good or service is determined by the politician's ability, e¤ort, and tax revenue. In this environment, e¢ ciency measures the level of service quality that can be produced at a given level of tax revenue. Voters value service quality and dislike taxes, and thus they care about both service quality and e¢ ciency. The incumbent faces an election against a randomly selected challenger at the end of the …rst period. Our key predictions are as follows. The larger the direct reward, or the better the information, the more the incumbent taxes, and the higher the e¤ort he makes. While higher e¤ort is not surprising, the prediction of higher taxation, which voters dislike, is a distinctive feature of our theoretical analysis. As both e¤ort and taxes rise, service quality is unambiguously increased by an incentive scheme. But, the e¤ect of either a larger direct reward, or better information, on e¢ ciency is ambiguous, because inputs, purchased by taxes, are also higher.
We then test these predictions, using Wales as a control group. Our results broadly con…rm the predictions of the theory. First, looking across a number of di¤erent measures of revenue, the introduction of CPA appears to have raised council tax revenues in England relative to Wales. For example, we see that the introduction of CPA raised the e¤ective band D council tax rate by about £ 40, or about 4%, in percent in England. To test the e¤ects of CPA on quality of output and e¢ ciency of local councils, we used specially constructed indices of both, described in more detail below (see also Porcelli(2010) on the e¢ ciency index). We …nd, consistently with the theory, that the CPA raised our quality of output index by 4% above what it would have been, had English local councils also been subject to the same regime as in Wales.
But, again consistently with the theory, we …nd that CPA either had no signi…cant e¤ect on e¢ ciency, or lowered it, depending on the e¢ ciency index used, and the estimation method. So, our …nding is consistent with the story that local authorities reacted to CPA by performing better, but also spending more. Therefore we conclude that CPA did not boost e¢ ciency overall. This is in stark contrast to the view of the Audit Commission (2009) that CPA has "done its job" e¤ectively.
We then look more closely at the impact of CPA on English councils. We do this in two ways. First, we look for evidence of a "catch-up" e¤ect. That is: did CPA impact more on less e¢ cient than on more e¢ cient English councils? We …nd that there is some evidence of a catch-up e¤ect on output; output of English councils that were initially less e¢ cient at the start of CPA increased by relatively more over the CPA period. But, they also raised their taxes by more, and perhaps as a consequence, there appears to be no catch-up e¤ect on e¢ ciency per se.
Our second approach notes that our theory predicts heterogenous treatment e¤ects of CPA on e¢ ciency. With the available data, we are able to test three of these. The …rst is that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA is more likely to be negative, the larger the percentage of the population paying a reduced or zero rate of property tax. The second is that a less generous reward for service quality should increase the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA. The third is that the degree of electoral competition will e¤ect the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA; we …nd that this e¤ect is weakly negative. We …nd some empirical support for all of these, although the evidence in favour of the third is rather weak.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 surveys related literature. Section 3 gives a brief overview of CPA. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework, and Section 5 describes our empirical strategy. Sections 6 and 7 give the baseline results and results on heterogenous treatment e¤ects respectively, and Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature
There are several related literatures. First, there is an academic literature on the CPA itself. Boyne(2009) and Revelli(2008) have already been mentioned in the introduction. Revelli (2010) is perhaps the most closely related. In this last paper Revelli studies the link between council spending and CPA scores. In particular, he …nds that spending in excess of the standard set by central government (standard spending assessment), can have a negative e¤ect on the CPA score. His theoretical explanation for this is that some councils are more e¢ cient than others in transforming expenditure into CPA scores. Moreover, he assumes that all councils have the same relative preferences for CPA scores and spending. In this environment, other things equal, a more e¢ cient council will both spend less and achieve a higher CPA score.
In contrast, our paper constructs an explicit index of e¢ ciency, independent of CPA, and asks how the introduction of CPA a¤ects the e¢ ciency of English councils, relative to Welsh ones. So, the two papers are quite di¤erent; we are more interested in the incentive e¤ects of CPA, whereas Revelli(2010) is focussing on CPA as a measure of performance or outcome. Basically, as explained in the previous Section, we do not believe that the CPA is a good measure of either output or e¢ ciency: rather, we are studying how it performed as an incentive scheme.
A second related literature is the wider one on incentives in the public sector. This is surveyed by Burgess and Ratto(2003) . Most relevant to our study is very recent and independent work by Burgess et. al. (2010) . They use the abolition of school league tables in Wales (but not in England) in 2002 as a natural experiment to estimate the e¤ect of league tables on secondary school performance. This is closely related to our study because one of the output indicators we use is the proportion of secondary school pupils achieving GCSE grades A to C in the local authority. Clearly, as CPA was introduced in England in the same year as school league tables were abolished in Wales, we cannot separately identify the e¤ect of both reforms on school "output". To deal with this problem, we also test whether CPA increased our output index excluding education. We …nd that the e¤ect of CPA is still signi…cantly positive but smaller in magnitude. This is consistent with a story where both CPA and school league tables have positive e¤ects on output.
Also related are Propper et al (2008 Propper et al ( ), (2008a , and Besley, Bevan and Burchardi(2009) , which are papers investigating the e¤ect of the hospital star rating regime in England over 2001-5 on waiting times for hospital treatment, using either Scotland and Wales as control groups. The hospital star rating regime is similar in form to CPA, with good performance closely tied to reducing waiting lists. All three of these papers …nd strong evidence that the scheme had the desired e¤ect on the targeted "output" i.e. waiting times were reduced in England relative to Scotland and Wales, although waiting times fell everywhere due to higher spending. Note also that all the papers just discussed only focus on single dimensions of local government "output"; unlike us, they do not address e¢ ciency issues, or look at taxation.
Finally, our theoretical model modestly extends a literature on principal-agent problems where the agent has several tasks to perform, initiated by the classic paper of Holmstrom-Milgrom(1991) . Holmstrom and Milgrom, however, restrict attention to a static framework, where monetary incentives can be used in an unrestricted way, and where the agent's payo¤ is exponential in money. extend that analysis to a career concerns framework, i.e. where the agent is rewarded not explicitly, but in proportion to their ability as inferred by the principal. There have been a few extensions 5 of the multi-task career concerns framework to political principal-agent 5 Less closely related contributions include Besley(2004 ), Caselli and Morelli(2004 ), Messner and Polborn(2004 , Mattozzi and Merlo(2008) . These papers mostly focus on the e¤ect of pay (…xed, not performance-related) on the incentive for di¤erent types of politicians to run for o¢ ce. Besley(2004) also looks at the e¤ect of varying pay on incentive and selection e¤ects of elections.
problems, notably Gersbach (2008) and Alesina and Tabellini(2008) . However, unlike us, neither of these papers allow for a speci…c reward being o¤ered for one task 6 .
The CPA -A Brief Overview
Local governments in England and Wales are of two types, unitary and two-tier. Unitary councils are responsible for primary and secondary education, social care, housing and housing bene…t payments, waste disposal, transport, and environment, planning, and culture. Two-tier governments (counties) have the same responsibilities, except for housing and housing bene…t, and environment, where responsibilities are shared with district councils. In this institutional setting, the precursor to CPA, introduced in the Local Government Act 1999, was the "Best Value" framework, which "provides a framework for the planning, delivery and continuous improvement of local authority services. The overriding purpose is to establish a culture of good management in local government for the delivery of e¢ cient, e¤ective and economic services that meet the users' needs." (http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk). A key part of this framework were the Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs), which were numerical scores measuring the quality of the above services provided by individual councils on various dimensions. Importantly for our purposes, BVPIs were calculated for both English and Welsh councils.
CPA, which started in the 2001/02 …nancial year, was a move to a stricter assessment regime within the general Best Value framework. In the …rst three rounds, the method for assessing the current performance of a council was the following. Performance of councils was assessed in seven categories 7 (social care; environment; libraries and leisure; use of resources; education; housing; housing bene…t payments). Where available, performance was assessed through already existing judgements from inspectorates and auditors, such as those by O¢ ce for Standards in Education (Ofsted) and Department for Education and Skills (DfES) for education. These were augmented with BVPIs. All this information was aggregated to obtain a score between 1 and 4 for each of the service blocks (with 1 being the 6 Alesina and Tabellini study a sequence of models where the incumbent politician assigns e¤ort to two tasks, and the level of performance on each task is fully observable, and depends additively on e¤ort and ability, as in our setting. But, the main focus is on redistributive policies; each of two voter groups only bene…ts from the performance on one task, and the politician can make a transfer between these two groups. Finally, Gersbach(2008) considers a political agency model with moral hazard only, i.e. where politicians do not di¤er in ability, and where voters are able to precommit to a re-election rule. 7 The CPA did not evaluate transport and planning.
lowest and 4 the highest). The scores were then weighted so that the scores for education and social services count four times, housing and environmental services twice, with the remaining blocks counting only once. These were then added up to produce a performance score of between 15 and 60 points, or 12 and 48 points for shire county councils (because they do not provide, and are therefore not assessed on, housing or bene…ts services). The performance scores were then aggregated to produce a performance rating of between 1 and 4 for each authority as shown in Table A2 of the Appendix. This score was then combined with an estimate the councils'ability to improve (1 to 4) as explained in the Table A2 of the Appendix to produce the …nal CPA score. In 2005, a new methodology, the "harder test" was introduced. The current performance of the LA was now assessed in the same categories with the exclusion of education, which was dropped. The main innovation, however, involved the aggregation procedure where the ability to improve was replaced by the corporate assessment, a three year period assessment of the council's ability "to lead its local community having clearly identi…ed its needs and set clear ambitions and priorities" (Audit Commission, 2009 ). Among the service categories social care and use of resources received e¤ectively a higher weighting than the other …ve through the aggregation rule in Table A3 (2007), we take the view that CPA is a hybrid measure, partly measuring levels of service quality (thorough the BVPIs), partly measuring operational e¢ ciency (use of resources) and partly broader aspects of corporate health or e¤ectiveness (ability to improve). As McLean et. al. (2007) point out, there may also be "categorization errors" in the aggregation procedure in Table A2 , where …ne numerical scores are compressed into just four categories. So, we take the view that CPA scores are measuring both service levels (output) and e¢ ciency, and are doing so with some error. In this paper, we are not interested as CPA as a measurement system, but as an incentive scheme. That is why we construct our own, independent, measures of output and e¢ ciency for local councils, with the aim of studying the e¤ect of the CPA regime on this measures, along with taxation.
We close this section with some very direct evidence which suggests that CPA was acting partly as an incentive scheme. Note from Table A3 that during the harder test period, a score of at least 9 on so-called "Level 1 assessments" was a crucial threshold for getting the highest possible overall score, given a …xed corporate assessment. Also, it was the case that corporate assessment scores were …xed over a three year period , which were also the last three years in our sample (see Audit Commission 2009b). So, over the period 2004/5 to 2006/7 we would expect a "bunching" of scores on level 1 assessments at 9. This is clearly the case, as the histogram below shows. In each of two periods t = 1; 2 an incumbent politician produces a local public good at quality level Q t . This depends on resources, in the form of tax revenue T t ; chosen by the incumbent 9 , plus an exogenous grant from central government G t ; the e¤ort input of the 8 In fact, before 2005, we do not know how the scores on individual services were aggregated to produce the points scores in Table A .2, because this information was never made public by the Audit Commission. 9 This captures the stylized fact that the Council Tax (a residential property tax) is the only major tax instrument for local government in England and Wales. Over the sample period, due to incoming the Labour government's decision to abandon "rate-capping", local authorities have had in practice considerable autonomy to set their council taxes. The government reserves the right to direct an authority to set a lower budget requirement if it considers that the Council Tax has been increased excessively. However capping took place only in 2004/05 and 2005/06 for 6 and 8 local authorities respectively.
incumbent, a t ; and also his ability parameter t :
where S t is total spending by local government. We assumef (a t ; S t ) is strictly concave. Also, following Rogo¤(1988) , Alesina and Tabellini(2008) , we assume that t follows a moving average process i.e. t = t + t 1 where t is a random draw from a symmetric distribution with mean zero, distribution H;and density h; and support [ ; ]. Symmetry and zero mean are assumed for convenience only. At the beginning of t = 1; both the incumbent and voters know 0 :
There is a continuum of measure 1 of voters. Voter i 2 [0; 1] has linear payo¤s over Q t and tax T t of the form
where i is i 0 s tax price of public spending, and may di¤er across voters. In England and
Wales, the only local tax is the property tax, so the natural interpretation of i would be that voter's property value relative to the average. The incumbent politician, while in o¢ ce, gains some o¢ ce-related bene…ts, R, and also incurs a cost of e¤ort. We also assume he puts some weight ! 0 on a weighted average of voter payo¤s, either because he himself is a tax-payer and consumer of the local public good, as would be natural in a citizen-candidate setting (Besley and Coate(1997) ), or because he is lobbied by special interest groups, or because he cares about his legacy (Maskin and Tirole(2004)) 10 . This of course nests the purely o¢ ce-seeking politician as a special case where ! = 0: So, the politician in o¢ ce has payo¤
where is the weighted average of the i : As the unweighted average of the i is one, < 1 if the politicians put more weight on poorer groups, for example. Finally, following Maskin and Tirole(2004) , we assume that when out of o¢ ce, the politician has zero payo¤.
The is an election at the end of period 1, described in more detail below. Also, the incentive scheme is only used in period 1 and is described in more detail below. This simpli…es the exposition, and in the two-period model, is without much loss of generality 11 .
Finally, although this model has been presented as one of an elected representative being motivated by voters via an election, in the British context, there is an alternative, and possibly more plausible, interpretation 12 . Councils in England and Wales have the following management structure; strategic decision-making is undertaken by an executive comprised of elected o¢ cials, typically in the form of a cabinet with the leader elected by council members, with day-to-day operations headed by a full-time CEO. One could argue that CPA is also a management tool for the executive to monitor the CEO. One can therefore re-interpret our model as follows. Voters can be plausibly re-interpreted as councillors, who live in the council district and who therefore have similar preferences to voters. The "politician" can be re-interpreted as the council CEO, who can be …red or otherwise sanctioned for poor performance. Thus, the election can be reinterpreted as any action that the executive can take to discipline the CEO. CPA is of value to councillors either because it gives them more information about CPA performance (a higher q); or because there are direct bene…ts to the CEO of a higher CPA score i.e. earned autonomy. This re-interpretation is of course, applicable to other contexts where there is also a clear division between legislative and executive functions, such council-manager local government in the US.
Political Equilibrium

Equilibrium in Period 2
Substituting (4.1) into (4.3), we see that the incumbent politician's expected payo¤ is
where f 2 (a 2 ; T 2 ) f 2 (a 2 ; G 2 + T 2 ). So, the politician's decision problem is characterized
where V ( 1 ) = V + ! 1 has the interpretation of the incumbent's expected continuation payo¤ at time 1, given observation of 1 ; but before 2 is known:
The Incentive Scheme and Equilibrium in Period 1
We begin by describing the incentive scheme. The politician gets a bonus B per unit of output, i.e. BQ 1 . This can be interpreted as monetary or psychological. Obviously, the second interpretation is appropriate in the case of CPA, as local o¢ cials -elected or not -do not get any direct personal payment as a result of a good CPA score. Moreover, in view of the important role in practice that CPA and other incentive schemes play in giving voters better information, we assume that in period 1, voters only observe output Q 1 before the election with probability q: We suppose that this q can be increased by the incentive scheme; we refer to this as the information e¤ect of the scheme: As Q 1 appears in the utility function, voters must observe it after the election i.e. at the end of period t; if they do not observe it earlier. Finally, it is assumed that voters always observe T 1 before the election, re ‡ecting the fact that local property taxes are highly "visible". The order of events in period 1 is then as follows. First, politicians choose a 1 ; T 1 ; knowing 0 : Then, voters vote for incumbent or challenger, having observed T 1 and, with probability q; Q 1 : The challenger's productivity is randomly drawn from the same distribution as the incumbent's. Finally, at t = 1; voters and the incumbent both know
First, consider the voter choice between the incumbent and challenger. We impose the natural condition that this decision must be sequentially rational i.e. the voters cannot precommit to a voting rule. Because distributional concerns, measured by , are …xed and the same across all politicians, voters only care about the productivity 1 of the incumbent and challenger. Given this, voter behavior is easily characterized. First, given knowledge of 0 , it is easily seen 13 that at the end of period 1; voters have enough information to infer 1 : So, once Q 1 ; T 1 are observed, voters infer that the incumbent's type is
where a e 1 is the voters'expected value of e¤ort choice by the incumbent. Now, we assume that voters vote rationally, up to a random error. In particular, if Q 1 has been observed, a voter votes for the incumbent if
where " is an idiosyncratic popularity shock, distributed uniformly on [ 1; 1] and is an aggregate popularity shock, distributed uniformly on [ 2 ; 2 ], where parameterizes the variance of this shock: In what follows, will be an (inverse) measure of electoral competition i.e. the lower ; the more sensitive is the re-election probability to performance. What if Q 1 has not been observed? Then, the voters cannot make any inference about 1 , and so they are indi¤erent between the incumbent and challenger. In this case, 13 Assume that voters know 0 : Then, as voters have observed Q 1 ; T 1 by the end of period 1; and voters also know that the incumbent has taken equilibrium action a 1 ; they can infer 1 from the relationship
we assume that they randomize between the two, so the incumbent is re-elected with probability 0.5.
Standard computations (see Appendix) then imply that, conditional on t the probability of re-election for the incumbent is
That is, the probability of re-election is higher, the higher the actual competence of the incumbent, and the higher output relative to output expected by voters. Note that the responsiveness of p to an increase in a 1 is proportional to q ; i.e. voters are more responsive to performance, the greater is electoral competition, or the more informative is the incentive scheme. Note also that in equilibrium, where a e 1 = a 1 ; choice of T 1 does not a¤ect the re-election probability; this is because it is directly observed by voters, not inferred.
So, given the re-election probability (4.7), at time t; the incumbent solves the following problem
where < 1 is a discount factor, and V ( ) is de…ned in (4.4). This has the interpretation that the incumbent maximizes his current payo¤, plus his expected continuation payo¤, if re-elected. Then, the …rst-order conditions to this problem, evaluated in equilibrium, where a e 1 = a 1 are
Note that (4.9) says that there are three motivations for the incumbent to supply e¤ort; some preference congruence with the electorate (! > 0); career concerns, measured by qV = ; and …nally the incentive scheme, B: Note also the asymmetry; career concerns a¤ect the choice of e¤ort, but not tax, ultimately because the voters can directly observe tax, but can only indirectly infer e¤ort.
So, given B and other parameters, the endogenous variables a 1 ; T 1 are simultaneously determined from the two equations (4.9), (4.10) and V is residually de…ned by (4.4). This constitutes a political equilibrium.
E¤ects of an Incentive Scheme
Here, we establish our main results of the e¤ects of an incentive scheme. We consider the e¤ects of small changes in both B and q on taxation, T 1 ; output, the expected value of Q 1 ; and also on "e¢ ciency", de…ned more precisely below. Note that up to a constant, the expected value of Q 1 is simply f (a 1 ; T 1 ) f 1 : Our …rst result, proved in the Appendix, is: Proposition 1. If T; a are weak complements i.e. f aT 0 then: (a)
So, we see that a stronger incentive scheme, interpreted as an increase in B and/or q, will unambiguously increase both taxes and expected output. Note also that this result does not depend on the relative size of the direct e¤ect and the information e¤ect of the incentive scheme. This is important, because in the empirical work, we cannot estimate the e¤ects of B and q separately.
We now turn to look at e¢ ciency. In our setting, the natural measure of e¢ ciency, and the one that will be used in our empirical work, is the expected output f 1 ; minus the cost of inputs, T 1 ; e f (a 1 ; T 1 ) T 1 (4.11) From (4.11), the e¤ect of B or q on e¢ ciency is :
So, we see immediately that an increase in B or q has a an ambiguous e¤ect on e¢ ciency; there is a positive e¤ect via a 1 , but an e¤ect that can be negative via T 1 . Speci…cally, this e¤ect will be negative if the incumbent is already collecting too much tax revenue at the margin f T < 1. In turn, from (4.10), we can see intuitively that this is more likely to be the case if the bonus B is already large, there are strong career concerns, or , the politician's disutility of tax, is small enough. To pin down these e¤ects more precisely, assume that f is Cobb-Douglas: Then we can prove: Proposition 2. Assume f = a T ; ; > 0; + < 1: An increase in q increases e¢ ciency i¤
> . An increase in B increases e¢ ciency i¤
Note also that by straightforward computation 14 , the right-hand side of (4.13) is increasing in
: So, as q; V; only appear on right-hand side of (4.13), we see that introducing a small incentive scheme, or increasing the incentive scheme by a small amount, can decrease e¢ ciency if: (i) career concerns V are strong e.g. from (4.4), the ego-rent R from o¢ ce is high; (ii) electoral competition is high i.e. is low; (iii) if is low, re ‡ecting a e.g. low tax price facing the median voter; (iv) the incentive scheme is more informative to voters i.e. large q. Some of these results may appear counter-intuitive, but they all arise from the fact that the higher "career concerns", measured by qV ; the greater the tendency to set a high tax in the …rst period, in order to boost output and get re-elected. In turn, from (4.12), if the tax is high enough, it can lead to lower e¢ ciency.
Empirical Strategy
Empirical Speci…cation
Our empirical approach is to estimate the impact of CPA on e¢ ciency in a quasi-experimental setting through di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation, using Wales, where CPA was not used, as a control group. and the input and output variables used to construct our service quality and e¢ ciency indices are very similar in the two countries (see Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix) . Third, as documented by Haubrich and McLean(2006b) , WPI was, compared to CPA, a much less prescriptive and elaborate assessment regime since only con…dential assessments were produced, the evaluation criteria were based only on local self-assessment without quantitative rankings, and no formal rewards or punishments were speci…ed. 15 Information and data about the Welsh Program for Improvement can be collected from the web site of the Wales Audit O¢ ce www.wao.gov.uk. 16 All Welsh local authorites are unitary, but they have the same responsibilities as English local authorities, and until 2006, the same funding structure. 17 It is important to note that the greater regional autonomy obtained in Wales at the end of the 1990s does not interfere with our analysis since the The National Assembly for Wales was created by the As a further check, we test whether our identi…cation assumption holds by testing whether our dependent variables i.e. the Y it in (5.1) follow a common time path in the years before the introduction of CPA in 2001. First, as a "visual" test, Figures A.1, A.2 , and A.3 in Appendix D show the common trend followed by the three main dependent variables in England and Wales before the introduction of CPA. Moreover, using a formal test, also reported in Appendix D, we …nd that with a few exceptions, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they did follow a common time path.
So, we proceed by estimating the following;
where CP A t is a dummy that takes value 1 after 2001 and D i is a dummy that takes value one for English councils. Also, X it is a vector of controls. In X it ; we included linear and quadratic time trends. These are general, not speci…c to each council, and the results are basically unchanged if they are omitted. Finally, Y it = T it ; Q it ; e it , where T it is a measure of revenue collected from the council tax, Q it a measure of service quality, and e it a measure of e¢ ciency: The main parameter of interest here is 2 which captures the treatment e¤ect of the CPA. The theory suggests that if Y it = T it ; Q it , then 2 > 0 but if Y it = e it ; 2 has an ambiguous sign theoretically. We have two di¤erent treatments of u i : First, we treat u i as a council …xed e¤ect. Then, we treat it as a random e¤ect, estimated using GLS 18 . Finally, some of the variables (all the outputs, and one of the tax variables) are between zero and 1, so also, as a robustness check, we estimate a non-linear model where the dependent variable is transformed to lie between zero and 1 as follows:
using a pooled Bernoulli quasi-MLE, 19 . In this case, u i is treated as …xed.
Standard errors in (5.1) are clustered at the council level, allowing for serial correlation in the " it . Finally, we take account of the problem, raised by Bertand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004) that even with clustered standard errors, there can be downward bias in the standard error in 2 . To deal with this, we follow the procedure recommended in that Government of Wales Act in 1998 and gained a limited primary legislative powers only in 2007. 18 The Mundlak (1978) approach will be followed in the estimation of the random e¤ects model. In this approach, the time-average of time-varying regerssors are included as asdditional regressors, in order to tackle the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors may not be orthogonal. 19 We are using the methodology proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) to tackle the possibility of non linearity in case of fractional dependent variable. In the GLM we also include council …xed e¤ects.
paper of collapsing the time dimension to before and after the treatment, and re-estimate all of our speci…cations. As can be seen by comparing tables A.7-A.9 in Appendix C to Tables 6.1-6.3 and 7.1-7.2 below, the results are robust to this alternative estimation method, providing evidence that serial correlation is not a problem.
Data
First, we discuss our choice of measures of T it ; Q it ; e it for English and Welsh councils over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . In the theory, T it is property tax revenue. The closest empirical proxy for this is the tax requirement in the o¢ cial statistics (CIPFA(2008a)) which is total (real) spending in the …nancial year minus revenue from the revenue support grant and other grants, and revenue from the business tax rate. We use the tax requirement, both as a raw …gure, and normalized in several ways. Speci…cally, we also measure T it as a percentage of the tax requirement to the budget requirement, where the latter is actual current expenditure that has to be …nanced by formula grants (which includes the police grant) and property tax revenue. Finally, we divide the tax requirement by the number of equivalent band D dwellings to get an e¤ective council tax rate. Next, we turn to the measurement of service quality Q it . We need to construct an index of service quality consistently across both English and Welsh local governments. To that end the BVPIs published by the Audit Commission for England and the Audit O¢ ce for Wales are the best source of information: …rst they are broadly accepted by the local governments as measures of output quality; second we are very con…dent about the comparability of these measures across local authorities since BVPIs were also chosen as one of the building blocks of the CPA procedure.
The …rst problem to solve was the absence of BVPIs for the housing and bene…t sector in case of the counties, where this function is managed by districts. As DEA requires observations for all units in all years, the only possible solution was to drop this sector from the e¢ ciency analysis. A further problem worth discussing is the short life of many BVPIs. Despite the fact that we could count more than 250 BVPIs published on the website of the Audit Commission, almost all of them have been subject to some changes after three or four years, and in many cases replaced with new indicators. There is also the problem that after 2001-2, BVPIs were de…ned and measured separately in both England and Wales, and there was very little overlap. In the end only …ve indicators could be used to measure the quality of output consistently for England and Wales; these measure aspects of education, social care of the elderly and children, waste disposal, and central services. These variables are de…ned in Table A4 of the Appendix, and summary statistics are given in table A5. But, it is important to note that expenditure on these categories accounts for fully 57% of the total local government expenditure, on average 20 .
As is clear from that table, four of the …ve BVPIs are already expressed as percentages; we converted BVPI54 to a percentage also, and averaged it with BVPI49, thus giving an aggregate index for social services. We then calculated Q it as the weighted average of these four indices, where the weights used were the relative expenditures on the four services, in real £ per pupil for education, and real £ per capita for the others, where all monetary amounts were de ‡ated using the 2005 CPI. Summary statistics on these expenditures are given in the bottom panel of Table A5 . The source for the expenditure data is from the Finance and General Statistics (FGS) and Local Government Comparative Statistics (LGCS), available on the website of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) from the 1997/98 to the 2007/08 …nancial years (CIPFA (2008b) and CIPFA (2008c)).
Our e¢ ciency index e it is constructed as follows. We estimate a e¢ ciency index e it for each council and year in the sample using data envelopment analysis (DEA hereafter). 22 As output measures, we use the same …ve BVPIs used to construct the output index. As inputs, we use the expenditures already mentioned, corresponding to those outputs. DEA generates two indices. The …rst, the input index, e IN it , has the following intuitive interpretation. If council i was using the technology e¢ ciently at time t, its inputs could all be scaled down by a fraction 1 e IN it and it would still be able to produce the vector of outputs y it . The second, the output index, e
OU T it
has a similar interpretation: if council i was using the technology e¢ ciently at time t its outputs could all be scaled up by an amount e
, whilst using the same vector of inputs x it . Formal de…nitions are given in Appendix B, and some descriptive statistics are provided in Table  A6 . Finally, it is also explained in Appendix B that e IN it ; e OU T it will generally be upward biased. So, as also explained there, we used bootstrap methods to correct for that bias, yielding bias-corrected versions of both e IN it ; e OU T it . Finally, our control variables X it are described in Table A6 of the Appendix, and can be subdivided in the following sub-categories. First, are demographic variables, such as 20 Remarkably, if one takes a less demanding view, and only requires identical BVPIs measured in England and Wales in only one year before, and one year after, the introduction of CPA, which is a minimal requirement for di¤erence in di¤erence analysis, there just was just one additional BVPI available, the percentage of recycled household waste that was used to generate energy.
21 Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) . 22 DEA was …rst developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) ; a complete survey of data evelopment analysis can be found in Ali and Seiford (1993) .
the percentage of the total population below the age of 16 and above the age of 75, the percentage of population that declare themselves religious, the percentage of white people, the population density, and …nally the percentage of households who own their house, the number of band D equivalent dwellings per capita that correspond to the tax base of the council tax and has been included as a proxy of the demand for local public services. The second category includes a set of dummy variables to capture the impact of the ruling party and the features of the electoral system ("all out" election every four years, or "by thirds" system which involves more frequent elections). The third group of variables is related to the structure of the local economy and includes: average household disposable income, the percentage of the workforce claiming unemployment-related bene…ts, the percentage of people below 65 claiming disability living allowance, the percentage of VAT tax payers in the …nancial and real estate sector, the percentage of high quali…ed workforce, and the percentage of workforce self employed 23 .
Empirical Results
The …rst, empirical prediction of the theoretical model is that CPA should increase council tax revenues (Proposition 2). So, we …rst estimate (5.1) with Y it = T it . As a …rst pass, Figure A .1 of Appendix D shows that the council e¤ective tax rate (the tax requirement per equivalent band D dwelling) exhibits a clear increase in England relative to Wales after 2002. So, we would expect 2 to be signi…cantly positive. For each of the three tax measures described above, we estimate three speci…cations of (5.1), as described in Section 5.1 above. Table 6 .1 shows that irrespective of the estimation method and with all three tax measures, 2 is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level. According to out linear estimates, (FE and RE), the introduction of CPA raised the tax requirement by about £ 24 per capita, or 7.5% in England relative to Wales, the tax requirement as a percentage of the budget by about 2.5 percent in England relative to Wales, and …nally raised the e¤ective council tax rate by about £ 52, corresponding roughly to a 4 percent increase in England relative to Wales 24 . For the non-linear model, the average partial e¤ect is reported, which is the percentage change in the dependent variable caused by the treatment. So, in this model, the e¤ect of CPA is somewhat smaller. (1) Point estimates are expressed as average partial e¤ects Second, we estimate 2 in (5.1) when the dependent variable is our service quality index. As a …rst step, Figure A .2 in Appendix D shows clearly that the output index rose faster in England than in Wales after the introduction of CPA, so we would expect 2 > 0. Point estimates of 2 are reported in the …rst column of Table 6 .2 using the same econometric speci…cations as in Table 6 .1. Also in this case, irrespective of the estimation method, it is possible to observe a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of CPA on the level of outputs: on average, after the introduction of CPA, the aggregate output increased by 4% in English councils compared to Welsh local authorities.
But, as remarked in Section 2, a concern for us is that secondary school performance, as measured by the percentage of pupils achieving between A and C in GCSE exams, is a major component of our output index (with a weight of 63%). Burgess et. al. (2010) show that this measure of performance was impacted by school league tables, which were abolished in Wales it the same year in which CPA was introduced in England. To deal with this problem, we also test whether CPA increased our output index excluding education. The results are in column 2 of Table 6 .2: we …nd that in our baseline …xed e¤ects speci…cation, the e¤ect of CPA is still signi…cantly positive but smaller in magnitude.
We believe that this is evidence that both CPA and other "service-speci…c" performance indicators such as school league tables can have positive e¤ects on output.
The other columns of Table 6 .2 display the results of the same exercise conducted considering the quality measures of each sector. So, for English local authorities, in general, there is empirical evidence of a positive e¤ect of CPA on all quality measures, with the exception of the percentage of household waste recycled. Thus, our results are again broadly consistent with the theory. Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%. Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in output index due to CPA.
(1) Point estimates are expressed as average partial e¤ects.
We turn to look at the e¤ect of CPA on our e¢ ciency indices. Figure A .3 of Appendix D shows the path of the e¢ ciency index in England and Wales (average between input and output approach) between 1997 and 2007. In both countries the initial decreasing trend in e¢ ciency reversed its course after the introduction of CPA, and although the initial gap between Welsh and English councils is completely closed in the last year, there is no clear evidence of a positive impact of CPA on the e¢ ciency of English local authorities. This suggests an insigni…cant 2 , which is in fact what we …nd. Our econometric speci…cations are the same as in the previous two tables, except for the third speci…cation. In this case, to account for the possibility of non-linearity, we exploit the fact that the DEA indices of e¢ ciency have an ordinal meaning; therefore we use as a dependent variable a binary indicator that will take value one if the council is ranked above the 50th percentile in the distribution of the DEA e¢ ciency scores, and zero otherwise. This gives a random e¤ect probit model estimated using the unconditional MLE estimator.
25
Looking at Table 6 .3, there is no empirical evidence in favour of a an impact of CPA on the e¢ ciency of English councils. The coe¢ cient of the treatment e¤ect is statistically signi…cant only in case of RE probit model in relation to the input approach, however the magnitude of the estimate tell us that after the introduction of CPA the probability of observing a council ranked in the upper 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index distribution decreased by 0.3%, a very small number that leads us to the conclusion that the introduction of CPA did not stimulate any change in the e¢ ciency of English local authorities in delivering public services. Finally, our estimates con…rm the presence of a generalized quadratic trend in case of the linear model. Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
(1) Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in e¢ ciency index due to CPA.
(2) Dependent variable is 1 in year t i¤ council is ranked in the upper 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency distribution in year t. Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index distribution. 25 It is important to note that also in this case, like for the RE model, the Mundlak (1978) approach will be followed in order to tackle the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors may not be orthogonal.
Heterogenous Treatment E¤ects
In this Section, we investigate how -if at all -the e¤ect of CPA depends qualitatively on LA characteristics. We investigate this by estimating the following speci…cation:
where Z it is a local government characteristic, that could, for example, proxy for one of the theoretical characteristics described in Proposition 2. So, this allows us to estimate the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects of CPA. Note that this speci…cation, via the inclusion of Z it CP A t ; and CP A t D i Z it allows for characteristic Z it to have separate e¤ects on e it in both England and Wales before and after CPA. 26 Therefore, in this case, the parameter of interest is 4 . The …rst possible heterogenous e¤ect that we investigate is whether CPA had a "catchup" e¤ect -that is, whether it had a greater impact on badly-performing councils in England than on well-performing councils. To do this, we rank councils in England and Wales by their average e¢ ciency score over the period prior to the introduction of CPA i.e. 1997-1999. 27 We then split the sample at the median, with Z it = 1 if the council is below the median time-averaged e¢ ciency score. So, in this case, Z it is independent of i: In Table 7 .1 below, we present results on the estimates of 4 for council tax, output, and e¢ ciency. The format of the table is in line with those used previously; that is we report the estimate of 4 for …xed and random e¤ects speci…cations. Moreover for the aggregate output and the e¢ ciency index we also consider two di¤erent non-linear speci…cations as we did respectively in table 6.3 and 6.2 . In column 1 of table 7.1, we see evidence that relative to "good" English councils, ine¢ cient English councils increased council tax by signi…cantly more (around £ 14 in terms of the real per capita tax requirement) during the CPA period. As column 2 shows, this is re ‡ected in an increased relative output performance of more that 2% in terms of aggregate output, although it should be said that this e¤ect is less signi…cant if education is excluded (not reported). Perhaps as a result of these two countervailing e¤ects, there is no evidence that "bad" English councils increase their e¢ ciency relative to "good" English councils. So, there appears to be catch-up in output, but no evidence of a catch-up e¤ect on e¢ ciency. Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
(2) Percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index distribution after 1% change in the variable interacted with the treatment e¤ect.
Our second approach to heterogenous treatment e¤ects is theory-motivated; we look for reasonable empirical proxies for the variables that according to Proposition 2, might a¤ect the sign of de dB . First, we begin with , which is unambiguously predicted to increase the e¢ ciency of an incentive scheme. Recall that this is the politician's perceived tax price. Suppose (reasonably) this is equal, or close to, the median tax price in the jurisdiction. Given the tax is a property tax, then is lower, other things equal, if a larger fraction of the adult population who do not pay the property tax, or pay some reduced fraction of the council tax. In the UK, the main groups who do not pay the full amount of council tax on properties they own or rent are the unemployed and those on low incomes, who are eligible for Council Tax Bene…t (CTB). For example, in 2010, 68% of those in receipt of CTB were claiming Jobseeker's allowance, incapacity bene…t, or income support. We do not have data on CTB or income support recipients by council, so, we proxy (inversely) by the % of the workforce in receipt of Jobseeker's allowance, plus % of the adult population under 65 in receipt of incapacity bene…t.
The estimates of 4 are shown in Table 7 .2 below. We expect 4 < 0 as our variable is an inverse measure of the tax price. The format of the table is the same as in the case of Table 6 .3. That is, we report the estimate of 4 for …xed and random e¤ects speci…cations, and for a probit where the dependent variable is 1 if unit of observation i was ranked in the top 50th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. In case of the linear models 4 point estimates can be interpreted as the percentage increase in e¢ ciency observed in English local authorities, given a 1% increase in Z it , after the introduction of CPA. In case of non linear model 4 point estimates are displayed in terms of average partial e¤ect, i.e. they exhibit the percentage change in the probability of observing a council ranked e¢ cient (i.e. above the 50th percentile in terms of DEA e¢ ciency scores) after 1% increase in Z it that follows the introduction of CPA in English local authorities. We see that the estimated 4 is mostly negative, and is certainly negative whenever it is signi…cant. Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
(1) Percentage change in e¢ ciency after 1% change in the variable interacted with treatment e¤ect.
Next, recall that Proposition 2 predicts that an increase in B can decrease e¢ ciency, and generally, will have some impact either way. The introduction, after 2004, of the "harder-test" procedure for the computation of CPA scores allows to test the impact of B on e¢ ciency. In particular, it is quite plausible to assume that the intensity of the bonus (B) decreased after the new regime became e¤ective since it was more di¢ cult to obtain a high CPA score. In this last case Z it corresponds to a dummy which takes value one after 2004, and the point estimates reported in table 7.3 support our claim providing robust empirical evidence in favour of a positive e¤ect of the "harder-test" on LA's e¢ ciency. Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
(2) Percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of e¢ ciency index distribution after 1% change in the variable interacted with the treatment e¤ect.
A third variable that can be empirically proxied is the degree of electoral competition. Our available measure of this is the vote share of the party with the largest number of votes at the last election, minus the vote share of the party with the second most number of votes. Call this the vote gap. What does this correspond to in the theory? The di¤erence in vote shares between the incumbent and the challenger is q(2s 1); where s = 1 2
(1 + + 1 ) is the share of voters voting for the incumbent when voting is "non-random" i.e. when Q 1 is observed, from (4.7), using e t = t : Conditional on 1 ; the di¤erence in vote shares, between the winner and the loser is thus
Taking the expectation with respect to 1 ; we see that theoretical equivalent of the observed vote gap is
This is non-monotonic in : increasing when > p 2 ; and decreasing otherwise: Now, from Proposition 2, e¢ ciency is predicted to be unambiguously increasing in : So, our empirical prediction is that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA should depend on the vote gap, but may be decreasing or increasing. Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
Some evidence of a signi…cant e¤ect is given in Table 7 .4; the e¤ect of the vote gap on e¢ ciency via CPA is always positive, and sometimes signi…cant.
Conclusions
This paper has studied Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive scheme for local government in England. A simple theoretical political agency model predicted that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of service provision. We tested these predictions using a di¤erence in di¤erence approach, using Welsh local authorities as a control group, exploiting the fact that local authorities in Wales were not subject to the same CPA regime. We also constructed indices of service quality and e¢ ciency, using Best Value Performance Indicators as well as expenditures on di¤erent categories of services. We estimate that CPA increased the e¤ective band D council tax rate in England relative to Wales by 4%, and increased our index of service quality output also by about 4%, but had no signi…cant e¤ect on our e¢ ciency indices. There is evidence of heterogenous e¤ects of CPA on e¢ ciency. Relative to "good" English councils, initially ine¢ cient English councils increased council tax by signi…cantly more during the CPA period. This is also re ‡ected in an increased relative output performance. Perhaps as a result of these two countervailing e¤ects, there is no evidence that "bad" English councils increase their e¢ ciency relative to "good" English councils. So, there appears to be catch-up in output, but no evidence of a catch-up e¤ect on e¢ ciency. Finally, consistently with the theory, the "harder test" from 2005-8 having a much bigger e¤ect, and also the e¤ect of CPA on e¢ ciency seems to be more negative in local authorities where there are larger numbers of voters who face a zero "tax price".
A Now from (4.5) and (4.1), we have
Finally, the overall probability of a win is
Combining (A.1),(A.2), (A.3), the result then follows. Proof of Proposition 1. From total di¤erentiation of (4.9), (4.10), and application of Cramer's rule, we have:
aT > 0)(!+B)(!+B+ qV = ) > 0 by the second-order conditions to the incumbent's optimization problem. [This is automatically satis…ed as f aa f T T f 2 aT > 0; from strict concavity of f; and !; B; qV = > 0]: So, as f aT 0; we see that
Also, in the event of a change in q :
A similar argument then proves that
> 0: Proof of Proposition 2. From (4.12), we can write:
But from (A.5), and f = a T ;we have
Combining (A.6), (A.7) gives the condition f T > : Again from (4.12), we have:
But from (4.11), and f = a T ;we have
Combining (A.8) and (A.9) gives (4.13).
A.2. Appendix B: Construction of the E¢ ciency Indices
Assume that the LA has q outputs that can be produced from l inputs, and y; x denote the output and input vectors respectively. The production possibility set is S = f(x; y) 2 R l+q + j y F (x)g; where F characterizes the e¢ cient frontier. Then the input requirement set X(y) = fx 2 R l + j (x; y) 2 Sg is the the set of inputs required to obtain a particular output quantity. Then for each input-output combination for LA i at time t, the associated e¢ ciency measure is e it = minfe 2 < j ex it 2 X(y it )g: So, in the case of the input approach, e it is the solution of the following linear program providing the e¢ ciency score for the council i in period t:
where x it is the vector of inputs of council i at time t, X is l N T the matrix of inputs of all N LAs over all T years, Y is the q N T matrix of outputs of N LAs over all T years, is a N T 1 vector of optimal weights, y it is the vector of outputs of council i at time t, and 0 is a 1 N T vector of (1; :::1). The last constraint is important for imposing variable returns to scale. Note that we are taking a pooled approach where only one production frontier is estimated and each region is compared also with itself in another year. In this way it is possible to use all the N T observations. The output approach is similar; the output possibility set Y (x) = fy 2 R q + j (x; y) 2 Sg is the the set of output vectors that are possible given input vector x: Then the output e¢ ciency measure is 1=e it ; where e it = maxfe 2 < j ey it 2 Y (x it )g: It is calculated using a similar linear program to (A.10).
The main problem with DEA is that it tends to produce an upward-biased estimate of the true Debreu-Farrell measure of technical e¢ ciency. The bias is due to the piece-wise shape of the DEA frontier that approximates the true unobserved frontier. As a result DEA underestimates the distance of all input/output combinations from the true frontier. Typically the bias, as well as the precision of the its estimation, become smaller as the number of observations increases and becomes larger as we increase the dimensions of the production function (see Kneip et al. 1998) . In this study, although more than 1500 observations are available, considering both English and Welsh councils in the production function, a "bias corrected" measure of e¢ ciency,ẽ it along with its interval of con…dence at the 95% level of signi…cance, CI it ; has been computed following the bootstrap methodology developed by Wilson (1998, 2000) .
After estimating our bias corrected measure of e¢ ciency we found that the Spearman correlation between e it andẽ it is 0.96 and 0.93 in cases of input and output approaches respectively. Therefore, given the large number of observations, the magnitude of the bias is not a big issue in this case, in fact e it andẽ it provide very similar regression results. The main concern is thatẽ it may be imprecisely estimated. The precision of the estimate ofẽ it is measured by the width of the CI it . So, to check the robustness of our bias-corrected measure of e¢ ciency, we drop observations where the e¢ ciency index is too imprecisely measured. To do this, …rst calculate the quartiles of the distribution of theẽ it . We then retain observationẽ it only if CI it lies entirely in one quartile; otherwise, we drop it. As a result, we have constructed a sub-sample of statistically "signi…cant" bias-corrected indices of e¢ ciency. As shown in Table A1 is possible to keep 64% of the DEA bias-corrected e¢ ciency indices in case of input approach, and 60% in case of output approach. A.3. Appendix C: Tables   Table A2. CPA aggregation rule, …rst three rounds. (1) Point estimates are in terms of average partial e¤ect. Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in output index due to CPA.
(1) Point estimates are in terms of average partial e¤ect. Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes *** signi…cant at 1%; ** signi…cant at 5%; * signi…cant at 10%.
(1) Ppercentage change in e¢ ciency index due to CPA.
(2) Percentage change in e¢ ciency after 1% change in the variable interacted with treatment e¤ect.
A.4. Appendix D: Testing the Common Trend Assumption
The fundamental identifying assumption underlying the validity of the quasi-experimental setting is that the variable of interest should follow the same time path in control and the treated group in the absence of the treatment. Figures A.1, A .2, and A.3 show that the e¤ective council tax rate, the aggregate output, and the e¢ ciency indices where following a similar path in England and Wales before the introduction of CPA. We test for this hypothesis more formally by running, for the pre-treatment period from 1997 to 2000, the regression
In (A.11) Y it is the variable of interest, t is the set of year dummies, D i is a dummy for English councils, and t is the parameter of interest. So, given that CPA started in 2001, the hypothesis that the variable of interest follows the same time path is simply H 0 : 97 ; 98 ; 99 ; 00 = 0: As reported in the following Table A .10 the null hypothesis of zero interaction can not be rejected in most of our tests. As reported in the table, p-values were below the critical threshold of the 10% signi…cance level only for the output variables related to social services and the environment sector, and for the raw index of e¢ ciency in case of output approach. 
